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A "Delicate and Difficult Task": Balancing
the Competing Interests of Federal Rule of
Evidence 612, the Work Product Doctrine,
and the Attorney-Client Privilege
DAISY HURST FLOYDIt
I. INTRODUCTION
In deciding Hickman v. Taylor,' the United States Supreme
Court was charged with balancing a policy of liberal discovery with
a basic tenet of the adversary system-that each party must de-
velop and present its own case. In a mastery of understatement,
the court noted: "[p]roperly to balance these competing interests is
a delicate and difficult task."
'2
Our legal system is full of "competing interests" undergirded
by potentially conflicting policies. An attorney is admonished to be
a zealous advocate, yet to be an officer of the court; a trial is a
search for the truth, yet we have evidentiary rules that exclude
plainly relevant evidence; the parties in civil cases are entitled to
liberal discovery to encourage settlement, yet each party must rely
on his or her own resources to prepare a case. As a consequence of
these competing interests, courts are engaged in many "delicate
and difficult tasks."
One of these tasks is to resolve the tension between the need
for a party to have everything necessary to cross-examine a witness
effectively and the policies underlying protection of information
through the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privi-
lege. The legal rules causing this underlying tension are Federal
Rule of Evidence 612,3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),4
and the rules surrounding attorney-client privilege.5 Federal Rule
t Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of
Law; B.A. Emory University; M.A. Emory University; J.D. University of Georgia School of
Law. I am grateful, as always, to Professor Timothy W. Floyd for his support during the
writing of this article.
1. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
2. Id. at 497.
3. FED. R. EviD. 612.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
5. All jurisdictions recognize the attorney-client privilege. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MOD-
ERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.3.1, at 250 (1986). For examples of state rules, see TEx. Civ. R. EvID.
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of Evidence 612 is a rule of disclosure, while Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3) and the attorney-client privilege are rules of
protection. Trial courts have had to struggle with reconciling these
rules not only because they represent a fundamental tension in our
system, but also because of poor draftsmanship of Federal Rule of
Evidence 612.6
This Article suggests that the attempt to reconcile the rules
has led to confusion and frustration in the courts that have consid-
ered the issue and that the confusion and frustration should be
relieved by an amendment to Rule 612. Such an amendment would
save parties and courts time, expense, and uncertainty, and would
insure that the conflict is resolved consistently with congressional
intent. The conflict has left trial courts bogged in discovery dis-
putes and has led to inconsistent application of Rule 612. It also
presents problems for the attorney who has a duty to properly pre-
pare witnesses but wants to avoid waiver.7
II. THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM-UNGUIDED JUDICIAL DISCRETION
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 612
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 codifies the "memory refresh-
ment doctrine," allowing parties to examine a document used by a
witness to refresh the witness's memory. At common law, a party
was allowed to examine any document used by a witness at trial to
refresh memory.' The purpose behind the rule was to allow cross-
examination of the witness about the source of his or her knowl-
edge. A party whose testimonial dependence on a writing was so
great that he or she could not testify from memory without it was
503; TEx. CRIM. R. Evm. 503; CAL. EvID. CODE § 954 (West 1995).
6. While a number of trial courts have struggled with resolving this conflict, the appel-
late courts have not been much help. Only two courts of appeals have addressed this issue.
See cases discussed infra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
7. Others commenting on this problem include Martha J. Aaron, Comment, Resolving
the Conflict Between Federal Rule of Evidence 612 and the Work-Product Doctrine: A
Proposed Solution, 38 KAN. L. REV. 1039 (1990) (summarizing the case development regard-
ing this conflict and proposing that the solution is to adopt a more restrictive approach to
what meets the definition of a document used for memory refreshment); Note, Interactions
Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and Work Product Protection Under the Federal
Rules, 88 YALE L.J. 390 (1978) (criticizing the approach taken by the court in Berkey Photo
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), arguing that that decision un-
duly broadens discovery to the detriment of the work product rule).
8. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 612 provides that "[t]he treatment of writ-
ings used to refresh recollection while on the stand is in accord with settled doctrine." FED.
R. EVID. 612 advisory committee's note. See also 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, McCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 9 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Annotation, Refreshment of Recollection
by Use of Memoranda or Other Writings § 60, 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 557 (1962) (discussing rele-
vant cases).
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subject to cross-examination about the true source of the testi-
mony. A party was not, however, allowed to see a document that
had been used by the witness to refresh his or her memory before
testifying."
In promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advisory
Committee recommended that the rule be changed to allow the op-
posing party to obtain documents used by a witness to refresh his
or her memory whether that was done before testifying or while
testifying.10 A debate about the soundness of this change in the
rule resulted in a compromise in the House committee: a document
used by a witness before testifying to refresh his or her memory
would be available to the opposing party according to the exercise
of the court's discretion. Therefore, while the rule requiring dis-
closure of a document used while testifying was left unchanged,
documents used before testifying were discoverable when the court
found disclosure necessary "in the interests of justice."1 Rule 612
in its current version provides:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by section 3500 of ti-
tle 18, United States Code, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory
for the purpose of testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is neces-
sary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evi-
dence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.12
9. Most courts refused disclosure of documents under these circumstances, but there
existed some authority for allowing disclosure within the court's discretion. See Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
10. FED. R. EVID. 612 advisory committee's note.
11. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
12. FED. R. Evm. 612. The rule further provides:
If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter
of the testimony the courts shall examine the writing in camera, excise any por-
tions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled
thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made availa-
ble to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or
delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any order justice
requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply,
the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion deter-
mines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
Id. Wright and Gold say that there are five questions that must be answered with regard to
Rule 612: (1) When is a writing used to "refresh memory"? (2) What is a "writing" for
purposes of Rule 612? (3) Who is an "adverse party"? (4) Can proceedings other than trials
be considered "hearings"? (5) If Rule 612 recognizes a right to introduce portions of writ-
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The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary explains
the basis for the compromise language that allows disclosure in the
discretion of the trial court:
As submitted to Congress, Rule 612 provided that except as set forth in 18
U.S.C. 3500, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the pur-
pose of testifying, 'either before or while testifying,' an adverse party is enti-
tled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-
examine the witness on it, and to introduce in evidence those portions relat-
ing to the witness' testimony. The Committee amended the Rule so as still
to require the production of writings used by a witness while testifying, but
to render the production of writings used by a witness to refresh his mem-
ory before testifying discretionary with the court in the interests of justice,
as is the case under existing federal law. See Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942). The Committee considered that permitting an adverse
party to require the production of writings used before testifying could re-
sult in fishing expeditions among a multitude of papers which a witness may
have used in preparing for trial.'
The laudable purpose of providing courts discretion on the
disclosure decision as a necessary accommodation of the competing
interests of protection and discovery has not been fulfilled. The
lack of guidance in the rule as to how courts should exercise that
discretion in the face of assertions of work product or attorney-
client privilege has led to confused judicial analysis. The confusion
in the courts is caused in part by the mixed signals emanating
from the House Committee report, the congressional debate, and
the language in the Advisory Committee's report about both the
purposes behind disclosure and the effect of existing privileges and
work product protection.
The House report indicates that Rule 612 was not meant to
overcome existing protections against disclosure: "The Committee
intends that nothing in the Rule be construed as barring the asser-
tion of a privilege with respect to writings used by a witness to
refresh his memory."
'14
An exchange on the House floor between the chair of the sub-
committee charged with drafting the rules and a Congressman
questioning the effect of the rule confirms that existing protections
were not intended to be eliminated by Rule 612:
MR. WHITE If there is, for instance, hypothetically, a personal injury ac-
ings, how does that provision interact with other rules that limit the admissibility of writ-
ings? 28 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §6183
(1993).
13. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
14. Id.
[Vol. 44
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tion, that is, if a party to the personal injury action asks for the work of an
attorney [to re]fresh his memory before he came to the [trial,] . . . then
would the adverse attorney and adverse party have the opportunity to in-
spect that work? MR. HUNGATE [T]he attorney's work product would not
be subject to ... inspection.
If it was used to refresh the memory of a witness would it then not be
subject to inspection?
If it were used while testifying. If it were used before testifying there
are different limitations on it. MR. WHITE You see, the way it reads, it
says "before testifying." In other words, if you use it before testifying then
it is a memory refreshener. MR. HUNGATE It can become a discretionary
matter with the court in that case. The rule was originally broader than
this, as I recall it. We have tried to narrow the past rule, the rule that [at]
one point could have meant bringing in everything you used to refresh your
memory, and the committee has sought to restrict that. You could use the
classic examples, for instance, of patent cases or antitrust cases where you
might have several large railroad boxcars full of documents, and to force
them to be brought in could prove to be harassment. MR. WHITE Does not
the chairman's own interpretation mean that at the court's discretion the
court could insist that the adverse party bring to the opponent the material
on which the witness refreshed his memory, is that correct? MR. HUN-
GATE The gentleman is raising a good point, because I think the gen-
tleman is putting two legal concepts at each other's throats, one would be
perhaps the original work product of the attorney, and I am not qualified to
say that this is paramount, but it was not meant to repeal the attorney-
client relationship, and, let me add, this does not write that out of its pre-
sent existence. It does not do away with it. What we concentrated upon was
in these extremely long cases where there would be lots and lots of docu-
ments, and where it would be a harassment to have them all brought in.
And it says again, as the gentleman I am sure realizes:
If the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interest of
justice ..... MR. WHITE Is not this then a change in the rule, a change
from the general evidentiary rules in the Federal courts? MR. HUNGATE
That is not the case, as I understand it. MR. WHITE Presently in civil ac-
tions or personal injury actions, using the same hypothetical question, can
an opponent obtain the material on which a witness refreshed his memory
before he comes to testify, before the case? MR. HUNGATE He could not
do so. MR. WHITE So this is a radical change. The point I am trying to
make is that this is an inconsistency, that a man would have to produce the
writings that he had used prior to coming to testify, whatever he refreshed
his memory on, but he probably could not use the same writing in that re-
gard, if these were self-serving to him. The lawyer's own work product
would then be subject to inspection if it was used to refresh the memory of
a witness, and thus you have intruded into a very established rule of law.
MR. HUNGATE However, we come back to the fact that this does not
wipe out the other sections of the law, or the law as it exists regarding the
1996]
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privilege of attorney-client relationships, or their work products. 1
The Advisory Committee's note, written in support of the
original version of the rule that required disclosure even when the
document was used to refresh memory before testifying, indicates
that the purpose of the rule is "to promote the search of credibility
and memory."16 Consistent with the Advisory Committee's ap-
proach, courts and commentators have recognized that the policy
behind Rule 612, even in its current form, is to ensure that testi-
mony is based on the witness's own memory and not on a "false
memory" planted there by a lawyer during refreshment. 17 Rule 612
is thus seen as protecting a party's right to effective cross-examina-
tion, that is, as allowing a party the necessary tools to identify and
impeach false memories.
III. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS-THE WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION
AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Work Product Protection
The purpose behind Federal Rule of Evidence 612-that in
many instances disclosure of documents used to refresh memory is
necessary to allow full cross-examination-sometimes presents a
conflict with another deeply held tenet of the adversary sys-
tem-that each party should be responsible for preparing his or
her own case. That tenet is the basis for the work product protec-
tion, first officially recognized in the Supreme Court's decision in
Hickman v. Taylor's and now embodied in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26.19
In Hickman v. Taylor, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether statements taken by a lawyer representing a tugboat com-
pany were discoverable pursuant to discovery requests made under
the relatively new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The state-
ments had been taken from several witnesses to a tugboat accident
in which five crew members were killed."° The statements were
taken close to the time of the accident "with an eye toward ...
15. 120 CONG. REC. 2381-82 (1974).
16. FED. R. EvID. 612 advisory committee's note.
17. 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 12, § 6183.
18. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
19. FED. R. Civ P. 26. Rule 26 does not use the label "work product," but instead refers
to "trial preparation materials." Id. Because courts and commentators have continued to
use the "work product" label, this article does as well.
20. 329 U.S. at 498.
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litigation"' and were recorded in memoranda prepared by the
attorney.
The argument in the lower courts centered on privilege; it was
clear that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were not meant to require disclosure of privileged infor-
mation.22 The party resisting discovery, therefore, argued that the
memoranda prepared by the attorney after interviewing witnesses
were covered by attorney-client privilege.23 The Court rejected that
argument, holding without discussion that the memoranda fell
outside of the scope of the privilege. Nevertheless, the Court held
that the statements were not discoverable, based on an assessment
of the traditional characteristics of the adversary system:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for
the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests
of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intru-
sion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's
case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his
strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and
the necessary way in... our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and
to protect their clients' interests.... Were such materials open to opposing
counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not
be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably de-
velop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial.
The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interest
of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.14
The Court held that the statements might be discoverable
upon a sufficient showing of need for the information or that the
lack of production of that information would "unduly prejudice the
preparation of petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injus-
tice. '2 5 Such a showing had not been made on the facts of Hick-
man: "Petitioner's counsel frankly admits that he wants the oral
statements only to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and
to make sure that he has overlooked nothing." 26 Further, the iden-
tity of the witnesses who had been interviewed was known to the
party seeking the statements, and those witnesses were available to
21. Id.
22. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
23. Id. at 508.
24. Id. at 510-11.
25. Id. at 509.
26. Id. at 513.
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him.27 That party had access to testimony given by those witnesses
during public hearings that took place just after the accident, and
"the essence of what petitioner seeks either has been revealed to
him already... or is readily available to him direct from the wit-
nesses ...."28
The Court hinted at what it might consider sufficient need:
Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file
and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's
case, discovery may properly be had. Such written statements and docu-
ments might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give
clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be use-
ful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. And production might be
justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only
with difficulty.
29
In addition to requiring a showing of need for the material
sought to be disclosed and prejudice resulting from a lack of dis-
closure, the Court indicated in its opinion that such a showing
would be nearly impossible to make when the information sought
contained an attorney's mental impressions."
After years of judicial struggle to define the parameters of the
rule set out in Hickman, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended in 1970 to incorporate the work product doctrine.3 1 Rule
27. Id. at 508.
28. Id. at 509.
29. Id. at 511.
30. Id. at 511-12.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (1970 amend.). The enactment of Rule 26(b)(3) did not end
the struggle over the scope of work product. There is continuing disagreement over what
categories of information are protected from discovery by the work product doctrine. This
disagreement stems in part from the fact that Rule 26(b)(3) covers only tangible work prod-
uct, while Hickman seemingly encompassed both tangible and intangible work product.
Also, there is some uncertainty over how the 1993 amendments to Rule 26(a), requiring
automatic disclosure of certain information during discovery, will impact the work product
doctrine. See James Holmes, Note, The Disruption of Mandatory Disclosure With the
Work Product Doctrine: An Analysis of a Potential Problem and a Proposed Solution, 73
Tsx. L. REv. 177 (1994).
The debate over work product extends beyond what the rule's parameters are. It in-
cludes calls for the elimination of work product protection. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Re-
thinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515 (1991), where the author states:
The discovery process was designed to correct unequal distribution of information
and to ensure that the trier of fact has access to all relevant information. The
work product doctrine prevents the discovery process from functioning as it was
designed to function. Instead, work product protection hides relevant information,
increases costs, and exaggerates the inequality of wealth and information of the
parties to a lawsuit. Further, the work product doctrine fails to achieve its own
objectives of assuring the best and most complete possible adversarial presenta-
tion of evidence at trial. These objectives would be better served by much nar-
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26(b) (3)provides:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may ob-
tain discovery of documents and tangible things, otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's repre-
sentative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemni-
tor, insurer, or agent) only upon showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case
and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
litigation.
32
The Advisory Committee's note to the original version of the
rule echo the concern of the Court in Hickman that the nature of
the adversary system not be undermined by the work product
protection:
[T]he requirement of a special showing for discovery of trial preparation
materials reflects the view that each side's informal evaluation of its case
should be protected, that each side should be encouraged to prepare inde-
pendently, and that one side should not automatically have the benefit of
the detailed preparatory work of the other side.33
Just as the Court in Hickman did, the drafters of Rule 26 pro-
vided for two categories of information entitled to work product
protection. 4 The first is information contained in documents or
rower rules that would address real concerns and would have an equal impact on
the parties.
Id. at 1582-83; Kathleen Waits, Work Product Protection for Witness Statements: Time for
Abolition, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 305 (1985).
[Work product protection for witness statements] causes unnecessary duplication
in the development of facts, can deprive parties of the most reliable eyewitness
accounts, and leads to unnecessary costs for litigants. Furthermore, the doctrine
as applied is biased toward large institutional litigants.... [W]ork product protec-
tion for witness statements glorifies the adversary system at great costs to litigants
and to the detriment of the search for truth in the courtroom.
Id. at 305.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
34. Much of the difficulty of applying the work product doctrine arises from the need to
distinguish the two types of work product-so-called "ordinary" work product, which does
not involve an attorney's mental impressions, and "opinion work product" which does. A
detailed discussion of this distinction is outside the scope of this article. For a thorough
analysis, see Kevin M. Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 755 (1983).
According to FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §5.11 (4th ed. 1992), there are
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tangible things, prepared in anticipation of litigation, that does not
contain an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories. That information is not absolutely protected from
discovery, but is instead afforded "qualified immunity; '35 it can be
discovered only upon a showing of substantial need for the infor-
mation and that the substantial equivalent of the information is
not discoverable without undue hardship to the party seeking dis-
closure."6 As to those documents and tangible things that include
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories, the
rule provides that the court shall protect against disclosure. Courts
have disagreed about the nature of the second protection, some
finding it to be absolute, but others finding information within it
discoverable but only upon a greater showing of need and hardship
than that required for disclosure of the first category of
information.3
The Sixth Circuit has set out a suggested analysis to be fol-
lowed when evaluating a claim of work product that is illustrative
of the approach generally taken by courts."' First, the party seek-
ing discovery must show that the documents or things sought are
otherwise discoverable, that is, that they are relevant and not priv-
four categories of materials in Rule 26(b): 1) witness statements, always obtainable by that
witness, 2) attorney's mental impressions, 3) expert opinions, and, 4) all other trial prepara-
tion materials.
35. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 733
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
37. See, e.g., Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1992).
In Holmgren, the court held that opinion work product is not immune from discovery but
that a greater showing is required than that required to obtain ordinary work product. The
court ordered disclosure of the mental impressions of an insurance agent because the mental
impressions were at issue, the need for the information was "compelling," and the informa-
tion sought was unavailable elsewhere. Id. at 577-78. Compare with Duplan Corp., 509 F.2d
at 734, where the court held that "no showing of relevance, substantial need or undue hard-
ship should justify compelled disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories." Id. The disagreement in the courts has been noted by commen-
tators. According to one, the inconsistency arises in part because "[o]pinion work product
has historically been the neglected orphan of the work product doctrine. Both case law and
commentators have focused primarily on ordinary work product. Traditionally, opinion
work product gets little more than a ceremonial incantation that it should receive greater
protection than ordinary work product." Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A Critical
Analysis of Current Law and a New Analytical Framework, 73 OR. L. REv. 385, 385 (1994).
There is some agreement that even opinion work product can be overcome by either of
two exceptions: when the information is at issue, and when the information is developed to
perpetuate fraud or criminal conduct. See Andrea L. Borgford, Comment, The Protected
Status of Opinion Work Product: A Misconduct Exception, 68 WASH. L. REv. 881 (1993);
see, e.g., In re National Mortgage Equity Corporate Mortgage Pool Certificates Litigation,
116 F.R.D. 297 (C.D. Cal. 1987);.
38. Toledo Edison Co. v. G A Technologies, Inc., 847 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1988).
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ileged. The burden then shifts to the party resisting disclosure to
show that the document or tangible thing was "prepared in antici-
pation of litigation" by a party or the party's representative.3 9
Upon such a showing, the burden shifts back to the party seeking
disclosure to show the existence of a substantial need for the docu-
ment and that its substantial equivalent cannot be obtained with-
out undue hardship.40 "Attention is directed at alternative means
of acquiring the information that are less intrusive to the lawyer's
work and whether or not the information might have been fur-
nished in other ways."' 41 Finally, if the requisite showing is made,
the party opposing discovery can show the court that the docu-
ments or things contain the attorney's mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal theories and are, therefore, entitled to
greater protection.42
Because Rule 26 does not define substantial need and undue
hardship, courts have been left to develop those standards. Al-
though these are necessarily fact-dependent standards, some gen-
eralizations about what will constitute the required showing can be
made. According to a comprehensive survey of work product, the
substantial need requirement is the "least uniformly applied" 43 el-
ement of Rule 26. "Most cases skim over the substantial need re-
quirement by simply stating that it has been met. '44 The impor-
tance of the materials, that is, whether the party seeking discovery
needs the materials to prove its case, and whether the information
will be useful for impeachment purposes, are factors that courts
have found to be relevant in showing substantial need.45
The undue hardship requirement, "the single most important
factor" in deciding whether work product is overcome,46 is a little
clearer. To meet the requirement, a party must "try but be unable
to obtain the information contained in requested documents with-
out going to great lengths; lack knowledge of where else to obtain
the information; or show that the information is completely un-
available elsewhere. ' 47 For some courts, lapse of time will be
enough to meet the requirement on the theory that "statements
taken from witnesses close to the time of the occurrence are
39. Id. at 339.
40. Id. at 339-40.
41. Id. at 340.
42. Id.
43. Clermont, supra note 34, at 802.
44. Id. at 802 n.247.
45. Id. at 802; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 12, at §6188.
46. CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 595 (5th ed. 1994).
47. Clermont, supra note 34, at 801.
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unique." 48 A party does not meet the substantial equivalent re-
quirement of Rule 26(b)(3) by showing unavailability of identical
information; "the party is not entitled to discover a document
merely because he cannot get the same information from the same
person.
49
One commentator has summed up the judicial approach to
work product in this way:
Building upon the Advisory Committee notes, courts have identified several
recurring situations that, as a group, cover most discovery situations. These
characterizations include contemporaneous statements, unavailability or
death of witnesses, proven hostility or reluctance of witnesses, a strong pos-
sibility of material, impeaching discrepancies between a witness's state-
ments, inability of the plaintiff to obtain counsel until after the incident
giving rise to the action, lapse of time since the original statement, and, in
unique cases, the expense of obtaining discovery. Courts often view proof
that one's case fits within one of these characterizations as satisfying the
rule 26(b)(3) test for permitting discovery of protected materials."
The requisite showing of substantial need and undue hardship
is not the only basis upon which work product is discoverable. A
claim of work product protection can be waived. Because the pur-
pose underlying the work product protection is to preserve the
characteristics of the adversarial system, courts have held that
waiver of work product occurs only when the information is volun-
tarily disclosed to an adversary or under circumstances that will
enable an adversary to have access to the information.51 Involun-
tary disclosure, pursuant to a court order, has been held not to
constitute a waiver.2 Similarly, disclosure to a third person who is
not an adversary will not effect a waiver. 3 The United States Su-
48. 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 12, at § 6184. This judicial approach is consistent
with the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 26, which also indicates that a lapse in time
may satisfy requirements for discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
49. Clermont, supra note 34, at 802-03.
50. Id. at 803-04 (footnotes omitted).
51. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. The Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414, 1429 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A] party who discloses documents protected by the work-prod-
uct doctrine may continue to assert the doctrine's protection only when the disclosure fur-
thers the doctrine's underlying goal."); In re John Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1082 (4th Cir. 1981)
(attorney's disclosure of information covered by work product protection "substantially and
freely increased the possibility of disclosure" and therefore effected a waiver).
52. Shields v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1989). If the disclosure pursu-
ant to a court order is made without objection, however, the court might find that it was
voluntary rather than involuntary. Id.; see also Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694
F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1983).
53. This distinguishes waiver of the work product protection from waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege. Because the attorney-client privilege is based on a need to protect con-
fidentiality, disclosure to anyone outside of the confidential relationship will result in a
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preme Court has held that "testimonial use" of material containing
work product can result in a waiver. 4 Disclosure of information
protected by work product to an ally does not effect a waiver; such
a disclosure strengthens rather than weakens the adversary system.
A specialized application of a conflict between the work prod-
uct doctrine and disclosure of a document used to prepare a wit-
ness to testify arises when the witness is a testifying expert. Rule
26(b)(4) provides special rules applicable to discovery when expert
witnesses are involved in a matter, and Rule 26(b)(3) states at the
outset that it is subject to 26(b)(4).55 The current version of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) provides:
(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an ex-
pert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report from the expert is
required under subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition shall not be conducted
until after the report is provided."'
Rule 26(a)(2), dealing with disclosure of expert testimony,
provides:
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party
shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at
trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclos-
ure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to
provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the
party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a writ-
waiver. Shields, 864 F.2d at 379.
54. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). The Court did not consider the effect
of Rule 612 because the trial took place before the Federal Rules of Evidence were effective.
Id. at 231 n.6.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See Toledo Edison Co. v. G A Technologies, Inc., 847 F.2d
335 (6th Cir. 1988):
The court may not order discovery of materials if discovery of such materials
would violate Rule 26(b)(4) involving trial preparation, i.e., experts. Different
standards and procedures are set forth because of the nature of experts and the
different purposes for which they are employed. Experts are used by parties for
different purposes just as information is prepared or acquired by parties for differ-
ent purposes .... Rule 26(b)(4) specifically and exclusively deals with the stan-
dards and methods of discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts ac-
quired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial. Subdivision (b)(4)
does not apply to facts known or opinions held by experts not acquired or devel-
oped in anticipation of litigation or for trial. If it is shown that the facts or opin-
ions of the expert were so acquired the standards and procedures of subdivision
(b)(4) apply.
Id. at 340.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
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ten report prepared and signed by the witness. The report shall contain a
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and rea-
sons therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness in
forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support
for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all pub-
lications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the com-
pensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other
cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition
within the preceding four years.
(C) These disclosures shall be made at the times and in the sequence
directed by the court. In the absence of other directions from the court or
stipulation by the parties, the disclosures shall be made at least 90 days
before the trial date or the date the case is to be ready for trial or, if the
evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same sub-
ject matter identified by another party under paragraph (2)(B), within 30
days after the disclosure made by the other party. The parties shall supple-
ment these disclosures when required under subdivision (e)(1).57
Most of the scholarship regarding whether trial preparation
materials used to prepare an expert for testifying should be dis-
closed have focused on a 26(b)(4) justification for disclosure rather
than a 612 disclosure." Many courts have seen an internal conflict
between the protective aspects of the work product doctrine as
codified in (b)(3) and special rules applying to discovery of infor-
mation from experts in (b)(4).
Along with other changes made to the discovery process in the
1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26(b)(4)
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
58. Much of the discussion of disclosure of work product as necessary to allow effective
cross-examination has focused on the internal conflict between the protections of Rule
26(b)(3) and the disclosure provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) pertaining to discovery of expert
witnesses. See, e.g., Jan W. Henkel & 0. Lee Reed, Work Product Privilege and Discovery
of Expert Testimony: Resolving the Conflict Between Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4), 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313 (1988). The authors discuss the conflict
between Rule 26(b)(3) and Rule 612, but conclude that the courts' resolution of that conflict
is not helpful in resolving the internal conflict of Rule 26:
Cases analogizing the conflict between Rule 26(b)(3) and FRE 612 with the con-
flict between Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) are ill-founded because of the differing
purposes of Rule 26(b)(4) and FRE 612. The Supreme Court promulgated the two
rules for different reasons. The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) was to provide opposing
counsel with an economic and efficient alternative for gaining information. Federal
Rule of Evidence 612, on the other hand, provides opposing counsel with the only
route available to obtain information necessary for a thorough cross-examination
on the issue of witness credibility. This latter purpose presents a strong argument
for resolving the conflict between Rule 26(b)(3) and FRE 612 in favor of FRE 612.
The purpose associated with Rule 26(b)(4), however, is much less compelling, thus
making an analogy between the two conflicts illogical.
Id. at 334.
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was amended to allow automatic discovery from experts. 9 It is un-
clear what effect this change will have on the judicial resolution of
the conflict between work product and discovery of information
shown to experts. However, because the amendments allow for eas-
ier discovery of expert opinions, it can be predicted that the
amendments will bolster decisions that hold that work product
protection is overcome when a document is used to inform a testi-
fying expert's opinion.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
Another protection from disclosure of material relevant to liti-
gation arises from the attorney-client privilege. The privilege pro-
tects confidential communications between a client and his or her
attorney. The privilege is the oldest of many recognized privileges
and has its roots in both constitutional protections and policy con-
siderations.60 The most noted purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege is to encourage effective, truthful communication between the
59. The former version of Rule 26(b)(4) provided:
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by ex-
perts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be ob-
tained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to
state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state
the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may
order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope
and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees
and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial,
only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in respond-
ing to discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii)
with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision
(b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay
the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the
latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (1988) (amended 1993).
60. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MicH.
L. REV. 1605 (1986), for discussion and criticism of the traditional justifications for the at-
torney-client privilege.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
attorney and client. 1 Its constitutional foundations include the
right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination.6 2 Both the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discovery provisions 63 and the
Federal Rules of Evidence6 4 recognize the existence of the attor-
ney-client privilege.
Like work product protection, the attorney-client privilege
prevents the disclosure of information that is relevant and that
might greatly contribute to the fact-finding process.6 5 Unlike work
product, however, the attorney-client privilege is not overcome by
application of a balancing test; it is overcome only by showing that
it has been waived.
The privilege encompasses only communications between the
attorney and client and then only communications that are in-
tended to be confidential.6 The scope of the privilege encompasses
any advice sought from or given by the attorney even if the attor-
ney-client relationship never progresses beyond an initial consulta-
tion; the privilege generally extends beyond the existence of the
attorney-client relationship.6 7 The privilege extends to those acting
as an agent or representative for the attorney or the client.6 8
The question of who is a representative of the attorney for
purposes of the privilege has caused some difficulty in the context
of Rule 612. According to one commentator, those covered under
the privilege include the following representatives:
[L]aw clerks, paralegals, investigators, and similar agents as well as mem-
bers of the office staff who assist in transmitting messages back and forth
61. WOLFRAM, supra note 5, § 4.4, at 163-64.
62. For a discussion of the constitutional basis for the privilege, see CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 5.8, at 463-64 (1995); WOLFRAM,
supra note 5, §6.2, at 248-49.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. In fact, privilege is the only limitation on the discovery of rele-
vant information. Id.
64. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not recognize particular privileges, but they pro-
vide for application in federal court of federal common law privileges and state law privi-
leges in civil cases "with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision." FED. R. EVID. 501. Federal common law and all states recog-
nize the attorney-client privilege. WOLFRAM, supra note 5, § 6.3.1, at 250.
65. Just as is the case with the work product protection, there is a crime-fraud excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege. Invocation of this exception requires one to show that
the attorney was consulted or retained to promote criminal or fraudulent activity and that
the communications asserted to be privileged were in furtherance of the crime or fraud. See,
e.g., In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Litig., 116 F.R.D.
297, 300 (C.D. Cal. 1987); CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1995); Tax. Civ. R. EVID. 503(d)(1);
Tsx. CRIM. R. EVID. 503(d)(1).
66. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 62, §§ 5.12, 5.13, at 480-92.
67. Id. § 5.9, at 464.
68. Id. § 5.10, at 472-75.
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between lawyer and client such as secretaries, receptionists, messengers, and
other office personnel. . . .The privilege also reaches outside experts em-
ployed to assist the attorney in providing legal services to the client, such as
an accountant, physician, psychotherapist, appraiser, patent agent, inter-
preter, polygraph examiner, or similar consultants. . . Experts hired to
testify are generally not viewed as representatives of the client for purposes
of the privilege because their communications are subject to disclosure at
trial and therefore cannot be considered confidential."9
Unlike the work product protection, materials within the at-
torney-client privilege are discoverable only upon a waiver of the
privilege. The privilege rules do not recognize anything akin to the
balancing test of substantial need and undue hardship that can
overcome work product protection. Waiver of the attorney-client
privilege occurs through "the client's voluntary disclosure or con-
sent to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged commu-
nication or matter in a non-privileged setting. ' 70 Difficult issues
arise with regard to waiver of the attorney-client privilege, includ-
ing matters of partial or selective disclosure, and voluntary versus
inadvertent disclosure. Courts have also had to decide what per-
sons are within the circle of people to whom information can be
disclosed without effecting a waiver:
Sharing with co-parties has long been immunized against waiver, as has
sharing with nonparties who have a common foe, and courts are fairly free
in finding common interests sufficient to avoid a waiver. But disclosure to a
close relative or other confidant can be expected to result in a waiver unless
this further communication is itself privileged, such as a communication to
a spouse or psychotherapist.
7'
Although the client is the holder of the privilege, the attorney has
some implied authority to waive it on behalf of the client.7 2 The
person seeking the disclosure bears the burden of proving that a
waiver has occurred. 3
Waiver may occur purposely or inadvertently, although some
courts disagree about the circumstances under which inadvertent
waiver occurs. The waiver most frequently occurs through the cli-
ent's or lawyer's disclosure of the confidential communication to
someone other than those included within the scope of the privi-
69. Id. § 5.10, at 472-74 (footnotes omitted). Mueller and Kirkpatrick also note, with
greater certainty than is warranted based on the cases discussed in this article, that "the
opinions and reports of such testifying experts constitute work product, the discovery of
which is regulated by FRCP 26(b)(4)." Id.
70. Id. §5.28, at 561.
71. Marcus, supra note 60, at 1638.




lege. Courts have found a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
when the communication either initially takes place in a nonconfi-
dential setting, that is, in the presence of a third person who is not
within the scope of the privilege or when the communication is re-
peated to a third person who is not within the scope of the
privilege.
74
IV. ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS AND RESULTING CONFUSION
A. The Berkey Photo Approach
The starting point for much of the confusion that exists today
in Rule 612 analysis is Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,7 5
one of the earliest cases to address the potential conflict between
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 and the work product doctrine. In
Berkey Photo, the plaintiff moved to compel disclosure of four
notebooks used by the defendant to prepare its economic expert.
The notebooks were prepared by defendant's counsel and were his
"synthesis of the facts and factual issues. '76 The magistrate or-
dered disclosure of the notebooks based on Rule 612.77 The district
court reluctantly reversed the magistrate's decision, expressing
doubts that it was correct in doing So. 78 The district court first
found that the notebooks had been used to refresh a witness's
memory and, therefore, were within the scope of Rule 612.7' Rely-
ing on the Advisory Committee's note to provide a standard, the
court held that the notebooks had had "'an impact upon the testi-
mony of the witness.' "80
The court next looked to see if production under 612 was ei-
ther barred by privilege or not "'necessary in the interests of jus-
tice.' , The court held that although the notebooks were work
product, work product protection could be waived. 2 It was not
74. For a discussion of the circumstances under which the attorney-client privilege has
been held to be waived, see WOLFRAM, supra note 5, § 6.3.7, at 264-66; MUELLER & KIRKPAT-
RICK, supra note 62, § 5.13.
75. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The decision in Berkey Photo is typical in that the
court had to resolve the Rule 612 issue in the context of ' discovery dispute. According to
Wright and Gold, even though Rule 30 "provides little support for extending the scope of
Rule 612 to depositions," the "vast majority" of courts have held that Rule 30 means that
Rule 612 applies in depositions. 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 12, at 452-53.
76. 74 F.R.D. at 614.
77. Id. at 615.
78. Id. at 617.
79. Id. at 614-15.
80. Id. at 615.
81. Id. at 616.
82. Id. In its analysis, the court did not consider the fact that the witness to whom the
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clear, however, what type of work product the court found the
notebooks to be. At one point, the court indicated that the note-
books contained mental impressions of the lawyer,83 yet at another
point in the opinion, the court seemed less certain: "counsel's se-
lection and ordering come close to the vital area of maximum pro-
tection under Hickman.
8 4
Although the court acknowledged that "there are intimations
that Rule 612 was intended to leave privileges generally un-
touched,""5 it found that the privilege could be waived:
There is much to be said for a view that a party or its lawyer, meaning to
invoke the privilege, ought to use other and different materials, available
later to a cross-examiner, in the preparation of witnesses. When this simple
choice emerges the decision to give the work product to the witness could
well be deemed a waiver of the privilege."'
The court stopped short, however, of finding a waiver in this case,
because of the unsettled nature of the law.87 The court warned law-
yers that the result would be different in the future: "there will be
hereafter powerful reason to hold that materials considered work
product should be withheld from prospective witnesses if they are
to be withheld from opposing parties."88
The court noted the distinction between qualified and abso-
lute privilege, but seemed to establish a bad faith or misconduct
test for overcoming the absolute immunity of opinion work prod-
uct. According to the court, waiver would apply to even opinion
work product materials if the "immunized materials have been de-
liberately employed to prepare-and thus, very possibly, to influ-
ence and shape-testimony, with the anticipation that these efforts
should remain forever unknowable and undiscoverable. It ought
not to be comfortably supposed that a claim that extreme must
necessarily be sustained." ' The court also said that there would be
"room for allowing discovery, either on a theory of waiver or of
qualified privilege, where an attempt is made to exceed decent lim-
its of preparation on the one hand and concealment on the
notebooks were shown was an expert. Therefore, the court did not find that Rule 26(b)(4)
was a basis for waiver of work product; nor did the court have to consider whether the
expert should come within the attorney-client relationship for purposes of protection by the
attorney-client privilege because the parties did not assert attorney-client privilege.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 616 n.8.
85. Id. at 616.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 617.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 616-17.
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other." 90 The court found, however, that those circumstances did
not exist in this case.
The Berkey Photo decision has been repeatedly cited by other
courts faced with resolving the conflict between disclosure of a doc-
ument used to prepare a witness and work product or attorney-
client privilege. 1 Although the court in Berkey Photo did not or-
der disclosure and although it dealt only with a claim of work
product protection, Berkey Photo has been cited for the proposi-
tion that either the work product protection or the attorney-client
privilege has been waived when a document is shown to a witness
in preparation for trial. The case has also been cited for the pro-
position that disclosure, even of mental impressions, will be re-
quired on a misconduct theory-"where an attempt is made to ex-
ceed decent limits of preparation on the one hand and concealment
on the other." 92 The gaps in the Berkey Photo court's analysis
have generated confusion in subsequent decisions that have at-
tempted to rely on Berkey Photo in resolving the conflict between
Rule 612 and either work product or attorney-client privilege.
The court in James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,93 faced the
same issue as did the court in Berkey Photo. It did not, however,
show the same reluctance to apply a waiver theory to the parties
before it; it ordered disclosure of a binder prepared by counsel for
the plaintiff. 4 The binder had been reviewed by officers and em-
ployees of the plaintiff in preparation for deposition testimony.9 5
Just as in Berkey Photo, most of the documents contained in the
binder had already been turned over during discovery.' Therefore,
it was not the documents themselves or the information contained
in them that the plaintiff objected to turning over; rather, it was
the disclosure of which documents had been selected to prepare
the witnesses to which the plaintiff objected. 7 Unlike Berkey
Photo, however, the witness book in Raytheon was shown to a
party rather than to a non-party.
The court had no trouble labelling the binder opinion work
product, but found that the plaintiff had waived the right to assert
work product protection. 8 In its decision, it discussed the history
of the common law memory refreshment doctrine, as well as the
90. Id. at 617.
91. See infra notes 93-150 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
93. 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
94. Id. at 146.
95. Id. at 144.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 144-46.
[Vol. 44
A "DELICATE AND DIFFICULT TASK"
"ambiguous" legislative history of Rule 612.1" The court stated
that "Congress left the task of striking a balance between the com-
peting interests of full disclosure and the maintenance of confiden-
tiality for case by case determination."100
The decision in Raytheon evidences some confusion about the
proper analysis for resolving the Rule 612-work product conflict. In
relying on a waiver theory, the court was not required to analyze
whether the need to prepare for effective cross-examination satis-
fied the substantial need and undue hardship test of Rule 26. Yet,
the court addressed the application of a balancing test in response
to an argument that opinion work product should be given greater
protection than ordinary work product: "[iln a given case the fact
that the privileged documents contained attorneys' mental impres-
sions might cause the Court to strike the balance in favor of non-
disclosure."101 This was apparently not that "given case" since the
court resolved the conflict solely on a waiver theory.
The decision in Raytheon was in turn the basis for another
district court's ordering disclosure of a document in In Re Comair
Air Disaster Litigation.02 The document sought in that case was
an accident report prepared by defendant's employee, which was
used by a different employee to prepare for a deposition.103 Despite
the court's reliance on Raytheon, however, there were actually sev-
eral things about this case that made the analysis different from
that in Raytheon. First, the court did not apply a waiver theory.
Instead, it examined the language in Rule 26 that work product
would not be protected upon a showing of substantial need and
undue hardship.104 In doing so, it linked the language of Rule 612,
allowing the court discretion to decide whether to order disclosure,
and the policy behind Rule 612, which is to safeguard a party's
right to effective cross-examination, with the substantial need re-
quirement of Rule 26.105 The court held that Rules 612 and
26(b)(3) "dovetail[]"; 10 6 the policy permitting disclosure as an aid
to effective cross-examination supported a finding that the work
product protection does not apply because of "substantial need."
"When . . .a witness has used such materials [work product] to
refresh his recollection prior to testifying, F. R. Evid. 612 weights
99. Id.
100. Id. at 145.
101. Id. at 146.
102. 100 F.R.D. 350 (E.D. Ky. 1983).
103. Id. at 352.





the balance in favor of finding that the 'substantial need' exists,
because of the policy in favor of effective cross-examination. '107
Therefore, while applying the substantial need test, the court indi-
cated that Rule 612 required a finding that the test was met. The
court found that in this case the interests of justice required
disclosure.108
This decision, as were others, was less than clear about the
distinction between ordinary work product and opinion work prod-
uct for purposes of Rule 612. The court specifically noted that it
gave "great weight to the fact that no attorneys were involved in
preparation of the report."109 It is not clear from the opinion ex-
actly what difference this made to the court's decision, but it may
have been either an indication that the court felt that Rule 612
would not overcome attorney-client privilege as easily as it did
work product or an indication that the court's decision was based
on the sought-after document being ordinary work product rather
than opinion work product.110
Two opinions, one very recent, from the same district that de-
cided Berkey Photo show the continuing confusion of courts that
have ordered disclosure of a document used to refresh a witness's
memory. In In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos
Litigation,' the district court ordered disclosure of ordinary work
product used by the plaintiff to prepare for a deposition.112 The
court, relying to some extent on Berkey Photo, applied a balancing
test. 1 3 According to the court, "the 'interests of justice' standard
of Rule 612 incorporates as part of the balancing analysis the pro-
tection afforded by the work-product doctrine,... while the 'sub-
stantial need' requirement of Rule 26 can take into account the
107. Id.
108. Id. at 353-54.
109. Id. at 354.
110. The court indicated a greater protection for opinion work product because it al-
lowed the disclosing party to have an in camera inspection to determine whether mental
impressions, etc. should be redacted from the report "if such deletion would not result in
unfairness to the opposing party." Id.
111. 119 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. 1988).
112. Id. The book reviewed by the plaintiff was a "product book, containing pictures of
defendants' products, logos, boxes, containers and trade dress as well as the corporate histo-
ries of the defendants, [and] was produced by the attorneys in anticipation of litigation." Id.
at 5. Although the witness who was shown the product book was the plaintiff, the court did
not address the issue of whether attorney-client privilege should prevent disclosure.
113. Id. at 5-6. But it did not apply the test to the circumstances in which the Berkey
Photo court had indicated that a balancing test would be appropriate; here, the district
court found that the document used to refresh the witness's memory was ordinary rather
than opinion work product. Id. at 6.
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need for disclosure under Rule 612."11 4 This seems to be a sensible
approach and a helpful way of analyzing the Rule 612-Rule 26 con-
flict. Yet, the court confused matters by identifying two seemingly
independent options for a party seeking to compel disclosure of
work product: disclosure will be ordered "either upon a showing of
substantial need or upon evidence that it was used by the witness
to refresh his recollection."" 5 This indicates that, contrary to the
court's assertion, Rule 612 and Rule 26 are not being reconciled,
but rather are distinct bases for ordering disclosure, and that
under 612, a showing that the document had been used to refresh
recollection mandates disclosure.
To add to the confusion, the court held that while Rule 612
did not mandate disclosure in this case because of a failure to show
that the document refreshed memory, the substantial need test
was met because the document was necessary to impeach the
plaintiff's credibility: "Defendants have no other method of ob-
taining the identical material, i.e., the material that was shown to
the plaintiff. Defendants cannot by other means learn whether the
product book was used in a suggestive fashion so as to encourage
plaintiff to recognize items he would not otherwise recognize.""
6
The court's analysis, therefore, seems to be a waiver theory
disguised as a balancing test. The court concluded that if the docu-
ment was used to refresh memory, it should automatically be dis-
closed under Rule 612, but that even in the absence of that show-
ing, the document should be disclosed under Rule 26 because it
would be helpful to impeach the witness's credibility.17 There does
not seem to be much balancing required.
A more recent case, also from the Southern District of New
York, further illustrates the continuing confusion generated by the
lack of clarity in courts' articulation of a standard for resolving the
conflict, this time pulling the attorney-client privilege into the
fray." 8 The district court in Bank Hapoalim, B.M. v. American
114. Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. In one of the early cases dealing with waiver of the attorney-client privilege under
Rule 612, the district court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laborato-
ries, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1978), ordered disclosure of documents subject to attorney-
client privilege. The court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh relied on a pre-Rule 612 case, Bailey v.
Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972). In Bailey, the court held that the attorney-
client privilege had been waived by use of a document to refresh a witness's memory. Id. at
13. Although the court in Wheeling-Pittsburgh acknowledged Rule 612's distinction be-
tween documents used to refresh memory while testifying and those used before testifying,
it did not find the distinction persuasive: "If the paramount purpose of federal discovery
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Home Assurance Co.,119 ordered production of several of the re-
quested documents under Rule 612, finding that Rule 612 over-
comes both work product protection and the attorney-client privi-
lege. 120 In doing so, the court confused the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine for purposes of the Rule 612 analy-
sis, which in turn resulted in confusion between the effect of find-
ing a waiver and the effect of finding substantial need and undue
hardship under Rule 26.
The court summarized the rule used by courts in the circuit:
"Provided that the privileged documents can be said to have had
an impact on the testimony, courts then conduct a balancing test
to determine whether Rule 612 requires disclosure, notwithstand-
ing the existence of a privilege."'' The court used what it de-
scribed as the Berkey Photo122 balancing test, as expanded by In re
Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation:123 That
test, according to the court, requires examination of three factors:
1) whether the attorney exceeded the limits of proper prepara-
tion-concealment through improper assertion of the work product
doctrine, 2) whether the work product sought is factual or opinion,
and 3) "whether the document request 'constitutes a fishing
expedition.' ,,124
The court's reliance on that test was misplaced; that test is
rules is the ascertainment of the truth, the fact that a document was used to refresh one's
recollection prior to his testimony instead of during his testimony is of little significance."
81 F.R.D. at 10. Similarly, in Prucha v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 76 F.R.D. 207
(W.D. Wis. 1977), the court ordered disclosure of two statements used by the plaintiff to
refresh his memory in preparation for his deposition. Id. at 210. Both were statements made
by the plaintiff to his attorneys. Id. at 208. Yet, the court did not address an assertion of
attorney-client privilege in ordering disclosure. Instead, it appeared to have based its deci-
sion on a finding of substantial need, although it didn't directly address Rule 26:
In view of the increasingly liberal scope of permissible discovery, in view of the
lapse of time between plaintiff's accident and the time when defendants were in-
formed of it, which defendants allege has hampered them in the preparation of
their case, and in view of the failure of the plaintiff to indicate to the Court any
reasons why it should not exercise its discretion in favor of discovery in this mat-
ter, the Court finds that the ends of fairness are best served by allowing full dis-
closure. In so doing, the Court is not authorizing a 'fishing expedition' into the
files of plaintiff's attorneys.
Id. at 210.
119. No. 92 CIV. 3561, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4091 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1994).
120. Id. at *16-*23.
121. Id. at *18.
122. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
123. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4091, at *18-*19 citing In Re Joint Eastern and Southern
District Asbestos Litigation, 119 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. & S.D.N.Y. 1988).
124. Id. at *19 (citing In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation,
119 F.R.D. at 6.)
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from cases dealing with the clash between Rule 612 and the work
product doctrine; the factors established by the court in Asbestos
Litigation were based on an application of the substantial need
test of Rule 26.125 In Bank Hapoalim, however, the court was deal-
ing with documents protected by the attorney-client privilege
rather than by the work product doctrine. 126 The court neglected
this distinction in its analysis, even though the test it relied on
required the court to consider whether the document sought was
protected by opinion or fact work product.
This case also differs from Berkey Photo and Asbestos Litiga-
tion in that the documents ordered disclosed were not otherwise
available to the party seeking disclosure. In Berkey Photo, the doc-
uments themselves had already been disclosed during discovery; it
was the selection of certain documents that were sought to be pro-
tected by work product.12 7 Similarly, in Asbestos Litigation, the
defendant was seeking information about which documents it had
turned over to the plaintiff had been used by the plaintiff to pre-
pare for his deposition. 128 In Bank Hapoalim, in contrast, the doc-
uments held to be covered by the attorney-client privilege were
clearly not discoverable had they not been shown to the witness.
129
This difference may have led to a different conclusion than that
reached by the courts in Berkey Photo and Asbestos Litigation as
to whether the party seeking disclosure was engaged in a fishing
expedition. Yet, the court failed to address that distinction in its
opinion. 30
The magistrate in Barrer v. Women's National Bank,1 1 also
125. 119 F.R.D. at 6.
126. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4091, at *15. The magistrate's order requiring production
of nine documents was on review by the district court in Bank Hapoalim. Id. at *3-*4. The
documents had been reviewed by a supervisor for one of the parties in preparation for his
deposition. Id. at *3. Eight of the documents were letters written by the party's attorney to
either the witness or another employee of the party. Id. at *6. The ninth document was a
handwritten note written by the witness. Id. The court found that two of the documents
were not covered by the attorney-client privilege because they were written before an attor-
ney-client relationship existed. Id. at *14. The other seven, according to the district judge,
were covered by the privilege. Id. at *15.
127. 74 F.R.D. at 613.
128. 119 F.R.D. at 5.
129. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4091, at *18.
130. The court affirmed the magistrate's finding that the witness had relied on the doc-
ument. Id. at *20. The party resisting disclosure argued that the witness had only "looked"
at the document. Id. The court found that the witness had relied on the document because
he had spent two days preparing for the deposition and at his deposition he was able to
identify specific documents he had examined during his preparation. Id. at *21. In addition,
it didn't appear that the witness had had personal knowledge of the events, so the court
concluded that he must have learned about the events through review of the documents. Id.
131. 96 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1982).
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held that a waiver theory overcomes assertions of attorney-client
privilege. The opinion is interesting in its discussion of the legisla-
tive history behind Rule 612 and its consideration of policy argu-
ments against disclosure. 13 2 The document at issue was a memo
prepared by the president of the corporate defendant, which was
reviewed by the president in preparing for her deposition. 33 The
court held that the "interests of justice" standard of Rule 612 com-
pelled disclosure, despite the defendant's argument that the legis-
lative history of Rule 612 indicated an intent to leave privileges
undisturbed. 34 According to the court, had Congress meant to
grant total immunity to documents protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, it could have "used more specific and precise lan-
guage."'"3 The court noted that:
Congress could have explicitly included qualifying language to the effect
that privileged matters should not normally be produced, unless the court
found it absolutely necessary in the interests of justice. But Congress chose
to use a much more general and broader standard, thus suggesting a wider
range of judicial discretion in this area.1 '
The court also addressed the practical impact of a waiver the-
ory on trial preparation. 37 The defendant, who was opposing dis-
closure, argued that requiring disclosure of a document prepared
for the attorney by the client at the request of the attorney would
alter the ability of the attorney to represent the client effec-
tively. 3 8 The magistrate conceded the need to prepare such a doc-
ument at the outset of representation, but noted that the attorney-
client privilege could have been preserved by not making the docu-
ment available to the witness in preparation for the deposition.3 9
By choosing to use the document to prepare the witness, the attor-
ney had made it available. Any other decision, according to the
court, would "ignore the unfair disadvantage which could be
placed upon the cross-examiner by the simple expedient of using
only privileged writings to refresh recollection."' 40
One of the things that is interesting about the opinion in Bar-
rer is the court's finding that disclosure was justified by the need
132. Id.
133. Id. at 202.
134. Id. at 204-05; see also infra note 143.
135. 96 F.R.D. at 204 n.2.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 203-05.
138. Id. at 204.
139. Id. at 204 n.1.
140. Id. at 205 (discussing James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del.
1982)).
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to cross-examine effectively, that is, by the need to test whether
the document has planted false memories in the witness's mind.
141
This justification is inapposite when the document used to refresh
the witness's memory was originally prepared by the witness her-
self. The same danger of planting false memories would not be pre-
sent where the document shown to the witness was one prepared
by the witness as it would be when the document was prepared by
the attorney or someone else.
142
In Boring v. Keller, 43 the district court affirmed a magistrate's
ruling requiring disclosure of two documents used by an expert in
preparing to testify. 44 The documents were an unedited version of
the plaintiff's deposition, with the defendant's lawyer's impressions
and evaluations of the plaintiff's appearance and her demeanor as
a witness, 45 and an "expert witness letter" that contained "general
suggestions to experts for their deposition testimony, as well as
counsel's impressions, thoughts and opinions regarding issues
which are generally encountered in medical malpractice cases."'
46
Relying in part on Berkey Photo's waiver analysis, the court found
that even opinion work product is not protected when it has been
shown to an expert. 47 The court based its decision on two theories:
1) the work product protection is waived when "counsel had deliv-
ered work product to an expert to be 'useful to the client,' but then
withholds the material from an adversary who seeks to exploit the
fact of this assistance in cross-examining the witness"' 148 and 2)
Rule 26(b)(4) requires disclosure of information disclosed to an ex-
pert that formed the basis for the expert's opinion."49
B. The Third Circuit Approach
The Third Circuit is one of the few appellate courts that has
weighed in on the issue of whether the use of work product to pre-
pare a witness is a sufficient showing of need to require disclos-
ure. 5 ' A pair of decisions from that court, both of which denied
141. 96 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1982).
142. The magistrate did not, however, order the document immediately disclosed to the
opposing party. Instead, the magistrate ordered an in camera inspection to "strike the bal-
ance between plaintiffs interest in discovering any evidence favorable to him and the de-
fendant's interest in protecting the attorney-client relationship." Id.
143. 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
144. Id. at 408.
145. Id. at 404.
146. Id. at 405.
147. Id. at 407-08.
148. Id. at 407 (citing Berkey Photo).
149. Id. at 407-08.
150. The Third Circuit is not the only court of appeals to address the issue. The First
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disclosure, provides examples of two different approaches to
resolving the conflict.
In Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,'151 the court resolved the conflict
between disclosure and work product by relying on Rule 26, with
only a footnote reference to Rule 612.152 The case came to the
Third Circuit on a mandamus action.153 The district court ordered
production of a memorandum prepared by counsel and shown to
an expert witness in preparation for a deposition.5 4 Its order was
based on a holding that in a conflict between 26(b)(3) and (b)(4),
the work product rule was overridden by expert discovery rules.15
The district court found that the only way to prepare properly for
cross-examination of the expert was to have access to everything
the expert had used in preparing his testimony. 156 On mandamus
to the Third Circuit, the petitioner argued that the documents
sought were opinion work product and therefore not discoverable
even upon a showing of need.
1 7
The Third Circuit reversed the order compelling disclosure. Its
decision, just as was the district court's, was based not on Rule
612, but rather on the perceived conflict between 26(b)(3) and
(b)(4). The court based its decision both on a conclusion that the
need to have the document for cross-examination was not strong
and on the potential chilling effect of requiring attorneys to avoid
production by orally preparing witnesses instead of using written
memoranda. ' 8 As to the first, the court said: "[e]xamination and
cross-examination of the expert can be comprehensive and effec-
tive on the relevant issue of the basis for an expert's opinion with-
out an inquiry into the lawyer's role in assisting with the formula-
tion of the theory.' 59 As to the second,
[i]f attorneys are to feel free to commit to writing the mental processes by
which they sift and evaluate various possible theories on which they will
base their cases, they must feel confident that such material will be pro-
tected from disclosure. Otherwise, the freedom of thought essential to care-
Circuit, in Smith & Wesson, Div. of Bangor Punta Corp. v. United States, 782 F.2d 1074,
1083 (1st Cir. 1986), held, without discussion, that the trial court had not abused its discre-
tion in applying Rule 612's interests of justice standard to deny a motion to disclose a report
used by an expert witness to prepare.
151. 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 595 n.3.
153. Id. at 588.
154. Id. at 588-89.
155. Id. at 590-91.
156. Id. at 590.
157. Id. at 588.
158. Id. at 593-95.
159. Id. at 595.
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fully reasoned trial preparation would be inhibited.16 0
The court did not ignore Rule 612 altogether. It mentioned it
in a footnote, stating that the same reasoning that supported its
decision to deny disclosure on a Rule 26(b)(4) analysis would apply
to support a conclusion that 612 does not overcome work prod-
uct.', Yet, even though the court was explicit that it did not rely
on Rule 612, the balancing of interests it used is the same balanc-
ing used by other courts in reconciling the discretionary ruling
under 612 with the substantial need test of work product.
There was a sharp dissent in Bogosian, in which the dissenting
judge disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a document
used to prepare a witness is not necessary for effective cross-exami-
nation.16 2 It suggested an in camera inspection and a balancing test
to determine whether the documents' "impeachment value ...
would significantly outweigh the chill on development of legitimate
attorney work product that would admittedly accompany disclos-
ure."'16 3 Using language similar to that used by courts who analyze
the issue under Rule 612, the dissent stated:
[tiurning to the exercise of discretion, one circumstance that must guide the
district court in determining whether to quash the subpoena or, equiva-
lently in this case, to deny discovery, is the adverse parties' need for the
work product. I disagree with the majority's pronouncement-which it ap-
parently believes to be one of law-that evidence demonstrating that an
economist's theory did not originate or evolve as a result of his own re-
search, but rather as a result of the hiring lawyer's suggestion, is of only
'marginal value.' Rather, such a revelation could, in some cases, critically
alter the finder of fact's assessment of the expert's testimony. While the
majority would (I think) concede that the expert could be cross-examined
concerning the attorney's role in development of this theory, . . . the issue
here is whether (and when) extrinsic evidence can be used to impeach an
economist who denies or minimizes the lawyer's role in 'shaping' his 'expert'
findings.'"
A year after Bogosian, in Sporck v. Peil, e5 the Third Circuit
again dealt with the issue of whether documents used to prepare a
witness for deposition should be disclosed. This time, the witness
who reviewed documents selected and compiled by attorneys was
160. Id. at 593.
161. Id. at 595 n.3.
162. Id. at 597-99 (Becker, J. dissenting).
163. Id. at 598.
164. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
165. 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
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the defendant."" Because the witness was not an expert, the court
could not look to 26(b)(4) to help it resolve a conflict between dis-
closure and protection; instead, it based its decision on an analysis
of Rule 612.167
In Sporck, all the documents reviewed had already been
turned over to plaintiffs in discovery; it was conceded that none in
their original form contained work product.'68 The district court
held that the selection and grouping of documents for witness
preparation constituted work product. 69 But, the court held that it
was not opinion work product entitled to absolute protection and
that "the principles behind rule 612" supported the claim for dis-
closure. °7 0 The Third Circuit disagreed, holding that the selection
and compilation of documents was opinion work product, relying
on Raytheon and Berkey Photo.M  Unlike the courts in those two
cases, however, the Sporck court did not find that such use of the
documents required disclosure. 72 Instead, it represented appropri-
ate, even required, conduct by the attorney: "in selecting the docu-
ments that he thought relevant to Sporck's deposition, defense
counsel engaged in proper and necessary preparation of his client's
case." 173 The court noted that if disclosure were required, the wit-
ness would not have been well-prepared for the deposition, which
would have been to the detriment of both parties. 74
The court rejected an argument that any work product protec-
tion attributable to the document had been waived by showing it
to the client, citing Bogosian as having rejected the application of
a waiver theory. 75 Rather than establishing a test to resolve a con-
flict between work product and 612, however, the court said that
there was not a conflict.176 According to the court, the two rules
could be harmonized by the use of a simple procedure for deposing
the witness. 177 The questioning attorney's need to know what docu-
ments the witness had reviewed in preparing to testify could easily
be met by asking the witness what documents he reviewed relating
166. Id. at 313-14.
167. Id. at 317.
168. Id. at 313.
169. Id. at 314.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 316.
172. Id. at 316-17.
173. Id. at 316.
174. Id. at 317.
175. Id. at 317 n.6.
176. Id. at 318.
177. Id.
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to the subject matter of the questions.' Then, the questioning at-
torney could use the document, which, after all, had already been
disclosed and therefore was in the possession of the questioning
attorney, to cross-examine. 179 Through that questioning, the attor-
ney could determine whether the witness's testimony had been in-
fluenced by the attorney's selection of documents.' Such a resolu-
tion would protect the important policies underlying the work
product protection but also allow effective cross-examination of
the prepared witness: "In such a case, deposing counsel would dis-
cover the documents through his own wit, and not through the wit
of his adversary."' s '
The court held that under Rule 612 a party must meet three
conditions before disclosure would be ordered: "1) the witness
must use the writing to refresh his memory; 2) the witness must
use the writing for the purpose of testifying; and 3) the court must
determine that production is necessary in the interests of jus-
tice."'1 2 The issue in Sporck became difficult, according to the
court, only because the requesting party failed to lay a proper
foundation:
[I]f respondent's counsel had first elicited specific testimony from peti-
tioner, and then questioned petitioner as to which, if any, documents in-
formed that testimony, the work product petitioner seeks to pro-
tect-counsel's opinion of the strengths and weaknesses of the case as
represented by the group identification of documents selected by coun-
sel-would not have been implicated. Rather, because identification of such
documents would relate to specific substantive areas raised by respondent's
counsel, respondent would receive only those documents which deposing
counsel, through his own work product, was incisive enough to recognize
and question petitioner on. The fear that counsel for petitioner's work prod-
uct would be revealed would thus become groundless.183
The court's opinion in Sporck appears to be a good resolution
of the conflict between disclosure and protection; however, it will
work only in the situation in which the documents have already
been disclosed. It will not work when the document sought is itself
claimed to come within the work product protection-a different
analysis is required for that situation, and the court's opinion in





181. Id. at 318-19.
182. Id. at 317.
183. Id. at 318.
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Both approaches of the Third Circuit have been followed by
the lower courts. In an echo of the concerns expressed by the
Third Circuit in Bogosian, the court in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ven-
tritex, Inc.,'" also found it appropriate to base a decision regard-
ing requested disclosure of communications from counsel to expert
witnesses on the conflict between 26(b)(3) and (b)(4) 8 5 rather than
on Rule 612.18 However, the court did so for a different reason
than did the Third Circuit in Bogosian. Instead of finding that a
Rule 612 analysis would not make a difference in outcome, the
court decided that the law was simply too confused to allow clear
analysis under Rule 612: "[W]e are not satisfied that any court has
explained sufficiently how, in light of its legislative history (at least
in the House of Representatives), this Rule could be used to com-
pel disclosure of communications that otherwise would be privi-
leged or protected as work product.
1 8 7
Similarly, the district court in S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B.
Corp.,l8s relied on Bogosian for guidance on the issue of how much
protection should be afforded work product, even though it used a
Rule 612 analysis.8 9 The court cited Bogosian for the conclusion
that Rule 612 "should be construed narrowly in order to respect
the protections of work product material embodied in Rule 26
(b)(3)."190 The court explained, "[a]llowing disclosure under Rule
612 of documents protected by the work-product doctrine circum-
vents the requirement of 'substantial need' and 'undue hardship'
prior to discovery under Rule 26(b)(3)."' 9' Yet, the court seemed
not to question that any document actually used to refresh a wit-
ness's memory would be required to be disclosed, even in the face
of an assertion of work product: "While even a narrow construction
of Rule 612 mandates waiver of protections for portions of docu-
ments actually used to refresh, permitting discovery of the bulk of
the notes converts Rule 612, a rule of evidence, into a discovery
device."'192 In S & A Painting, the party seeking disclosure had not
184. 139 F.R.D. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
185. Id. at 391. The court also considered the tension between Rule 26(b)(3) and the
Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 and 705. Id.
186. Id. at 386 n.1. Although the specific request that was the basis for the motion was
rendered moot, the court took the opportunity to announce the "'law of the case' that will
govern discovery of communications from counsel to experts who will offer testimony in
conjunction with motions or trial." Id. at 385.
187. Id. at 386 n.1.
188. 103 F.R.D. 407 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
189. Id. at 409-10.




A "DELICATE AND DIFFICULT TASK"
shown actual use of the sought-after documents by the deponent,
except for several references to dates and one portion read aloud
during the deposition.""3 The court framed the issue in this case as
whether the entire document must be disclosed when a portion of
it has been used by the witness during the deposition.'"
Other courts have relied on the Third Circuit's opinion in
Sporck v. Piel. For example, Sporck was followed in the 1995 case
of Stone Container Corp. v. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co.19 5 In
this insurance case, the district court affirmed a magistrate's order
denying a motion to compel.' The documents sought were used
by a deposition witness to "recall 'somewhat' the circumstances
and events relating to"' 1" an insured loss. The witness was the Risk
Manager for the defendant insurer.9 " The court relied on Sporck
to hold that the selection of documents used to prepare the witness
was opinion work product and therefore entitled to 26(b)(3) pro-
tection. 9 In this instance, as in Sporck, all the documents used to
prepare a witness had already been turned over during
discovery.
200
As [the party seeking disclosure] already had all of the documents it sought
to compel, and thus could test [the witness's] recollection and credibility
without knowledge of the specific documents ... counsel selected for [the
witness's] review, this Court concludes that [the party seeking disclosure]
has not shown that the production of documents was necessary in the inter-
ests of justice.
20 1
The Stone Container court found that the selection of documents
for review by the witness would require the attorney to reveal his
"evaluation of the documents and his opinion of the most impor-
tant legal and factual issues in the litigation. 20 2 For that reason,
the selection of documents should not have to be disclosed, espe-
cially when the documents had already been revealed during
discovery.
20 3
Similarly, in a 1988 decision, a magistrate rejected an argu-
ment that use of a document to refresh memory meant that the
193. Id. at 409-10.
194. Id. at 410.
195. No. 93 CIV. 6626, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2400 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1995).
196. Id. at *13.
197. Id. at * 2.
198. Id. at *1-*2.
199. Id. at *11.
200. Id.
201. Id. at * 7.




document was needed for cross-examination and that, therefore,
the "substantial need" requirement of Rule 26(b)(3) had been met.
In Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., °4 the magistrate denied a motion
to compel discovery of notes made by the plaintiff in a sex discrim-
ination suit, which she reviewed the night before giving her deposi-
tion. The plaintiff contended that the notes were protected by
both the attorney-client privilege and work product,205 and the
magistrate agreed. The magistrate noted that without these protec-
tions, the documents would be discoverable because they are rele-
vant.2 06 According to the magistrate, a conclusion that the need to
cross-examine amounts to a showing of substantial need "ignore[s]
the rather clear Congressional intent" behind Rule 612.207 The
magistrate characterized the decisions requiring disclosure as elim-
inating the difference between discoverability of documents used
to refresh memory before testifying and those used while testify-
ing.208 Ignoring that distinction, according to the court, eliminates
the discretion granted the trial court under Rule 612.209
In assessing whether the assertion of work product protection
was overcome by a showing of substantial need, the magistrate
looked at the factors usually examined under a Rule 26(b)(3) anal-
ysis outside of the Rule 612 context. It rejected the defendant's
argument that it had "substantial need" of the plaintiff's notes:
This is not a case in which [defendant] does not have equal access to the
events which are the subject matter of the notes. The notes presumably are
of meetings and communications which the plaintiff has had with agents
and/or employees of [defendant]; [defendant] has full access to those agents
and/or employees in order to obtain evidence respecting the meetings and
communications.2 -
The magistrate also rejected Polaroid's argument that the dis-
closure was necessary because of the lapse of time between the
events recorded in the notes and the deposition and because of the
"extensiveness of Plaintiff's contemporaneous record".21' The mag-
istrate said that "[t]he lapse of eighteen months . . . is simply not
that long a period of time, especially when all parties were aware of
the events which form the basis of this dispute.
'" 212
204. 121 F.R.D. 13 (D. Mass. 1988).
205. Id. at 14.
206. Id. at 15.
207. Id. at 16.
208. Id. at 15.
209. Id. at 16.
210. Id. at 16-17.
211. Id. at 17.
212. Id.
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Finally, the magistrate also rejected the defendant's argument
that substantial need was shown because "[w]ithout reviewing
Plaintiff's notes, Polaroid is unable to explore discrepancies be-
tween Plaintiff's Complaint and her notes, and may also be de-
prived of access to substantive evidence in the form of admissions
and statements against interest. '213 In response to this argument,
the court said "Rule 612 . . .is a rule of evidence, not a rule of
discovery." 214 Therefore,
[t]he fact that what the plaintiff has written down may contain 'admissions'
and/or 'statements against interest' is not a ground for ordering disclosure.
The sole purpose of the rule is to allow disclosure when necessary 'to pro-
mote the search of credibility and memory' as a result of the use of docu-
ments to refresh recollection.
2 15
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A review of the cases in which courts have struggled to recon-
cile Rule 612 with those protections traditionally afforded by the
work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege reveals that
the resolution is not becoming clearer with experience. To the con-
trary, experience seems to be exacerbating the uncertainty stem-
ming from a less than clear rule. The courts have made the issue
difficult by their confusion of the several distinct analyses that can
arise when a party requests disclosure of a document because it
was shown to a witness before testifying.
If a court decides that the interests of justice require disclos-
ure of a document under Rule 612,216 and the party opposing dis-
closure asserts work product protection, the court needs to answer
two questions: 1) Does the document contain work product? 2) If it
does, has the party seeking disclosure overcome work product pro-
tection by the required showing of substantial need and undue
hardship under Rule 26(b)(3) or has the party resisting disclosure
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 17 (citing Sporck). The magistrate did note, however, that the decision
might be different at trial, rather than, as in this instance, when the documents were used to
prepare for a deposition, because "[t]he issues of credibility are more clearly drawn at that
time." Id. Therefore, the court ordered that the plaintiff preserve her notes: "I make no
ruling whatever on whether or not the trial judge, in his discretion, might order disclosure at
the time of plaintiff's testimony at trial regardless of whether plaintiff again reviews her
notes before testifying at trial." Id. at 17-18.
216. This decision would include the court's finding both that the document was used
to refresh the witness's memory and that, in the absence of some asserted protection, the
court would order disclosure "in the interests of justice." FED. R. EvID. 612.
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waived the right to claim work product protection by disclosing the
document to an adversary or disclosure under circumstances that
will enable an adversary to have access to that information? A
court should analyze whether to order disclosure by applying one
of the existing tests for determining whether work product is
discoverable.
This approach does not make Rule 612 irrelevant. Rule 612
gives the party the right to ask for disclosure of a document at trial
because it was used to refresh a witness's memory, a right that is
not otherwise explicitly provided for in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Further, Rule 612 manifests a policy of the importance of
effective cross-examination that might help a court find that sub-
stantial need has been shown. However, the fact that a witness has
been shown a document before testifying should not necessarily
lead to a conclusion that work product is overcome. The court
must find that the document should be disclosed based on a work
product analysis rather than that Rule 612 itself overcomes work
product.
Similarly, if a party asserts that a document requested under
Rule 612 is protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court
should look to see if the circumstances under which the witness
was shown a document to refresh his or her memory constituted a
waiver of attorney-client privilege, that is, whether the document
was revealed to someone other than the attorney, the client, or a
representative of either. Again, the court should not find that Rule
612 constitutes an automatic waiver of the attorney-client privilege
under circumstances that would not otherwise constitute a waiver.
Where the courts have taken a wrong turn is in not recogniz-
ing that these necessary analyses are distinct. Some courts, for ex-
ample, have held that attorney-client privilege is waived upon a
showing of substantial need and undue hardship. This is a finding
that Rule 612 itself constitutes a waiver because, by showing a wit-
ness a document before testifying, the opposing party has substan-
tial need of the document for effective cross-examination, and that
the substantial need overcomes an assertion of attorney-client
privilege. Such a holding confuses work product and attorney-cli-
ent privilege. It is also completely contrary to the usual ways for
finding that attorney-client privilege has been overcome and is in-
consistent with the policy concerns that have for many years sus-
tained that privilege. Nowhere in the legislative history is there
any indication that Congress meant such a result when it enacted
Rule 612.
Rule 612 should be amended to clarify the conditions under
which a court may exercise its discretion to order disclosure of a
document used to refresh a witness's memory in the face of an as-
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sertion of work product or privilege. The analysis has been so far
confused by the courts that judicial efforts to clarify it are not
likely to be successful, especially in light of disagreement about the
intent behind the rule.
The pertinent section of Rule 612 should be amended to add
the following language:
If a court finds that the interests of justice require disclosure of a writing
used to refresh a witness's memory before testifying, the court may order
disclosure of materials:
(a) to which a claim of protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) is asserted if:
(1) such disclosure would be permitted under Rule 26(b)(3); or
(2) the court finds that the asserted protection has been waived by dis-
closure of the writing to an adverse party or under circumstances under
which disclosure to an adverse party is likely;
(b) to which a claim of attorney-client privilege is asserted if the court finds
that the claimed privilege has been waived.
In determining whether these requirements are met, the court may consider
the effect of the witness's using the document to refresh memory, but use of
the document to refresh memory does not necessarily overcome assertions
of protection of trial preparation materials or materials protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
Such an amendment would have changed the analysis in many
of the cases discussed in this article. For example, the Berkey
Photo21 waiver analysis would not be sound under the amended
rule. In Berkey Photo, the court found a waiver (at least, a pro-
spective one) of work product based on the use of trial notebooks
to prepare a testifying expert. The court in essence held that Rule
612 itself effected a waiver.218 Yet, that decision is not consistent
with work product waiver analysis, which requires that the docu-
ment have been disclosed to the adversary or have been disclosed
under circumstances likely to result in disclosure to the adversary.
A more sound approach would be that required by the pro-
posed amendment to the rule. Under that amendment, the court's
analysis would not have rested on a waiver theory, but the court
could still have reached a conclusion to compel disclosure. Instead
of relying on waiver, the court would have had to decide whether
the work product protection was overcome by a showing of sub-
stantial need and undue hardship under Rule 26(b)(3). Had the
Berkey Photo decision applied the analysis of the suggested
amendment, the court's decision would not have created confusion
217. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
218. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
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by introducing a waiver theory into the analysis, would not have
led to a line of cases holding that Rule 612 necessitates disclosure,
and would have been consistent with treatment of work product in
other contexts.
Similarly, the analysis in cases such as Bank Hapoalim219 and
Barrer,220 dealing with assertions of the attorney-client privilege,
would have proceeded differently had the courts been applying the
analysis of the suggested amendment. In those cases, the courts
found that Rule 612 operated as a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege; by showing the document to a witness in preparation for
testifying, the party had waived the attorney-client privilege. Yet,
those holdings are inconsistent with the long-established rules of
attorney-client privilege, which protect documents within the priv-
ilege unless they have been revealed to someone outside of the at-
torney-client relationship. In Barrer, the documents were shown to
the client to prepare her for testifying. 21 In Bank Hapoalim, the
documents were shown to a witness who was an investigator for the
defendant insurance company's claims handling agent.222 Under a
traditional privilege analysis, those uses of the document would
not have effected a waiver, and the balancing test relied on by the
courts would not have been apposite. In those cases, Rule 612
alone was enough to find a waiver. Again, that result was not in-
tended by Congress in drafting Rule 612.
The magistrate in Derderian stated that Rule 612 "is a rule of
evidence, not a rule of discovery."2 3 That may be an accurate dis-
tinction in theory, but it is not one that holds up in the face of
experience. Rule 612, to the extent it allows a court to order dis-
closure of documents to an adversary, is a rule of discovery. There-
fore, the rule needs to recognize explicitly the traditional limita-
tions on discovery: work product protection and the attorney-client
privilege. The best way to do that is through an amendment to
Rule 612.
219. No. 92 CIV. 3561, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4091 (S.D.NY. Apr. 1, 1994).
220. 96 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1982).
221. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
223. 121 F.R.D. at 17.
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